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The Background, Requirements, and Future of
the GATT/WTO Preshipment Inspection
Agreement
Emily Rome
Preshipment inspection (PSI) is a service provided to devel-
oping countries to monitor the quantity and quality of their im-
ports. Without such a service, these countries would be unable
to adequately monitor imports due to government corruption
and a lack of infrastructure, resources, and experience. PSI is
usually provided to these countries by specialized private corpo-
rations. As PSI was increasingly used by developing countries,
larger exporting countries began complaining about the power
which PSI companies wielded over the private shipment of
goods. In response to these complaints and the perception that
PSI presented a threat to free trade, the Agreement on Preship-
ment Inspection (PSI Agreement, or Agreement)' was estab-
lished as part of the Uruguay Round of negotiations of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2
The PSI Agreement sets forth rules and obligations gov-
erning both the countries using PSI services and the PSI entities
themselves. Specifically, the Agreement obliges non-discrimina-
tory application of PSI, calls for procedural transparency, re-
quires confidentiality of private information learned during the
PSI process, and generally addresses the primary concerns held
by large exporting countries. The Agreement, unlike other
GATT side agreements, is also governed by its own dispute set-
tlement process. The Agreement omits, however, any assurance
that countries using PSI will be weaned from those practices in
favor of more conventional inspection methods.
This Note explains the historical underpinnings of the Pre-
shipment Inspection Agreement and analyzes both the Agree-
ment's requirements and its effectiveness. Part I briefly outlines
1. Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement
[hereinafter PSI Agreement], Annex 1A:10, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsuLTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter LEGAL INSTRUMENTS].
2. Final Act Embodying the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negoti-
ations, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter GATT], in LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 1.
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the historical development of PSI and describes the problems as-
sociated with its use. Part II summarizes the requirements of
the PSI Agreement and describes its dispute settlement mecha-
nism. Part III examines the benefits and problems accompany-
ing a country's decision to change from preshipment inspection
to conventional port-of-unloading inspection. Part IV examines
the future of preshipment inspection according to both industry
experts and the author. Finally, this Note concludes that pre-
shipment inspection is a valuable process which allows develop-
ing countries to participate in global trade at increasing levels of
effectiveness and efficiency, thereby facilitating growth in their
own economies while simultaneously contributing to global
trade. Consequently, contrary to the opinions of many export-
ers, PSI should not be eliminated. Instead, PSI should be re-
tained as an intermediate solution as developing countries
attempt to build their foreign trade sectors.
I. PRESHIPMENT INSPECTION HISTORY
A. THE PROCESS AND THE PLAYERS
Developing countries use importing procedures that differ
from those used by developed countries. Generally, the practice
of developed countries involves first receiving the imports into
their own ports of entry and then using customs officials to in-
spect the incoming products. 3 This is usually referred to as port-
of-unloading inspection. In developing countries, though, this
procedure is either not feasible or not desirable.4 Thus, a signifi-
cant number of developing countries choose PSI as a superior
alternative to port of unloading inspection. 5
3. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1-69, 2071-82 (1912) (describing the port-of-un-
loading customs procedure used in the United States). Sections 1 through 69
set forth the collection districts, ports, and officers. See id. §§ 1-69. Sections
2071-82 deal with the duties and authority of the Customs Service. See id.
§§ 2071-82.
4. See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text (discussing how corrup-
tion and lack of infrastructure make port-of-unloading inspection difficult for
developing countries).
5. PSI services cover only about 2% of world trade. Patrick Low, Preship-
ment Inspection Services, in WORLD BANK DIscussION PAPERS 278, 8 (The In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopmentiThe World Bank, 1995).
However, the Sub-Saharan African countries utilizing PSI, excluding the Re-
public of South Africa, account for nearly half of that region's trade. Id. This
figure is heavily influenced by the relative size of Nigeria. Id.
470 [Vol. 7:469
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1. The Process of PSI
In the preshipment inspection process, an importing coun-
try6 contracts with an independent third party to inspect the
goods in the exporting country prior to shipment. 7 The PSI pro-
cess consists of two different stages: physical inspection and
price verification.8 The physical inspection is designed to vali-
date the information the exporter provided on the invoice, in the
contract, or in other documents. 9 This inspection occurs in the
exporter's country at the site of the production or storage of the
goods.10
The price verification of PSI requires examination of the in-
voice price of the goods and comparison with prices of similar
goods offered from the same country under similar circum-
stances.1" Though both the physical inspection and price verifi-
cation are undertaken for the same goods, the two processes are
independent of each other.12 Even so, price verification occa-
sionally may rely on the physical inspection process to confirm
that the description of the goods corresponds to the merchandise
being exported. 13
Although preshipment inspection usually applies to all im-
ports, the country which has contracted for PSI may specifically
exempt certain import categories from inspection. 14 It is com-
mon for most PSI contracts to impose a threshold value below
which goods are exempt from the PSI process.' 5 In addition,
there are certain categories of goods, including "newspapers and
periodicals, personal effects, diplomatic goods, defense supplies,
and fresh produce," that are usually excluded from inspection.' 6
Each country utilizing the PSI process generally develops a
specialized contract with a PSI company to satisfy its particular
6. Though PSI may be used for both imports and exports, this Note fo-
cuses on the use of PSI with imports.
7. Low, supra note 5, at 8-9.
8. Id. at 8.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. See also PSI Agreement art. 2.20(b).
12. Low, supra note 5, at 8.
13. Some contracts provide for a preliminary price verification to be com-
pleted before the physical inspection. See infra notes 145-148 and accompany-
ing text (explaining the PSI article that addresses preliminary inspections).
14. Low, supra note 5, at 8-9.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 8. Subjecting these time-sensitive items to the PSI process would
delay the shipment too much, thereby decreasing or eliminating the economic
viability of the goods.
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needs.' 7 There are, however, some basic elements present in
most PSI programs. The following description of the steps of
PSI is taken from a comprehensive World Bank report on pre-
shipment inspection:
1. Upon deciding to import, the importer completes the necessary
documentary formalities of the import authorities, arranges payment
procedures with a commercial bank (usually by opening a letter of
credit), and notifies the local office of the PSI company of the intention
to import....
2. The local office of the PSI company makes a preliminary determi-
nation regarding the eligibility of the proposed transaction and trans-
mits an inspection order (usually by electronic means - electronic
data transfer, or EDT) to its affiliate in the country from which the
goods are being shipped.
3. The affiliate contacts the exporter..., seeks relevant information
about the proposed shipment, and arranges the time and place for a
physical inspection. Such information may include pro forma invoices,
price lists, transport costs, copies of letters of credit, technical litera-
ture pertaining to the product, packing lists, information about com-
missions payable to third parties, and shipping details. The affiliate
also undertakes price verification, tariff classification, and any other
tasks contractually specified ....
4. Upon satisfactory PSI, and production of the final invoice and proof
of shipment by the supplier . . ., the affiliate transmits a Report of
Findings (ROF) to the local PSI office in the importing country by EDT.
The affiliate also issues an ROF to the seller, which is a negotiable
document required in order for the commercial bank in the importing
country to authorize release of funds in payment for the goods. In
some cases, a customs duty report may be separately furnished. If PSI
proves unsatisfactory, the supplier may make the necessary adjust-
ments (for example, to the invoice price in the case of over-invoicing),
or the PSI company will issue a non-negotiable ROF. In cases of
under-invoicing, there is no reason to adjust the invoice price, and the
PSI company will simply indicate a dutiable value different from the
invoice price on the ROF.
5. The local office of the PSI company issues the ROF to the importer
for duty payment and customs clearance purposes, and also furnishes
copies to the importer's commercial bank, and the relevant government
authorities (customs, the central bank, etc.).
6. The importer... pays customs duties and taxes due (sometimes to
a commercial bank as a prior condition of customs clearance) and
clears the goods through customs, with the ROF, proof of payment of
taxes due, the import entry form, and other required documents. 18
2. The Preshipment Inspection Industry
Five firms offer PSI services: BIVAC International of Paris,
COTECNA of Geneva, Inchcape Testing Services International
17. Id.
18. Id.
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(ITSI) of London, Inspectorate America of Houston, and Socit
G6nerale de Surveillance (SGS) of Geneva. 19
SGS, founded more than 119 years ago, 20 dominates the PSI
industry. It was the first to enter the PSI business, doing so
when the Government of Zaire contracted for services in 1965.21
The other PSI companies did not begin to obtain government
contracts until the mid-1980s. 22 When the issue of preshipment
inspection gained prominence in 1986 and 1987,23 SGS had con-
tracts or licenses with twenty-three of the twenty-five countries
using PSI.24 Currently, SGS still dominates the industry, hold-
ing contracts for twenty-eight of the thirty-four countries that
still use preshipment inspection.25 As the largest PSI company,
SGS has more than 130 affiliated enterprises and maintains a
presence in more than 140 countries. 26 SGS serves countries by
inspecting and monitoring exports and imports of a variety of
goods, including agricultural and mineral products, petroleum,
petrochemicals, industrial equipment, and consumer goods.
27
SGS, like the other PSI companies, tries to minimize its clients'
risks by providing them with an independent assessment of the
imports and corresponding advice as to the accuracy and ade-
quacy of those imports. 28
19. Id. at 5.
20. Indonesia Clouds Surveillance (SGS) Prospects, REUTERS FIN. SERVS.,
Mar. 17, 1997, at Money Report.
21. Letter from Jeremiah J. O'Neill, Vice President, SGS Government Pro-
grams Inc., to Emily Rome, Staff Member, Minnesota Journal of Global Trade
(Dec. 9, 1997) (on file with author).
22. Low, supra note 5, at 5.
23. See infra notes 50-51 (discussing how four Florida trade groups' filing
of a Section 301 complaint began the critical discussion of PSI).
24. 40 Percent of Exports Subject to Preshipment Inspection in 1986
Delayed, ITC Study Finds, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1061-62 (Aug. 26,
1987).
25. As of November 1997, SGS held PSI contracts as the sole provider of
services in Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central Afri-
can Republic, Senegal, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic Congo, Guinea,
Ivory Coast, Uganda, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Philippines, Rwanda, and
Zambia. SGS Government Programs Inc., Form Number 14 November 1997/
mmc, (Nov. 1997) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade). In addi-
tion, as of November 1997 SGS also shared contracts with other PSI inspection
firms in Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Madagascar, Mexico,
Paraguay, Peru, and Tanzania. Id. Other countries that also employ PSI serv-
ices, though not those of SGS, include the following: Benin, Colombia, Kenya,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Zimbabwe. Id.
26. Id.
27. Indonesian Clouds Surveillance (SGS) Prospects, supra note 20.
28. Id.
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In the first fifteen years of PSI use, the focus of PSI compa-
nies was almost exclusively on preventing capital flight. Capital
flight is one of the oldest forms of corrupt practices in developing
countries. 29 It occurs when "convertible currency accruing to a
home country is conspicuously 'returned' to foreign countries
with little or nothing coming back to the home country as profit
or investment returns."30 The current concentration on customs
work did not develop until Indonesia contracted with SGS for
customs services in 1985.31 From the late 1980s and continuing
until the present, the focus of PSI work has gradually shifted
from over-invoicing toward under-invoicing practices such as tax
evasion. 32 Tax evasion, or import under-invoicing, can take "one
of three forms: the under-declaration of the value of a good in
collusion with a foreign supplier, the forgery of the invoice inde-
pendently of the supplier, and the mis-classification of an item
under a tariff heading carrying a lower tax rate."33
29. Konyin Ajayi, On the Trail of a Spectre-Destabilisation of Developing
and Transitional Economies: A Case Study of Corruption in Nigeria, 15 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 545, 548-49 (1997). In fact, banking experts have cited capital flight as
one of the most serious problems exacerbating the debt problems of developing
countries. Edwin Unsworth, U.S. Firms Could Be Aiding Illegal LDC Capital
Flight, J. CoM., Apr. 15, 1987, at IA. Some estimate that from 1977 to 1987
losses to developing countries through capital flight have exceeded $198 billion.
Id. Capital flight has traditionally been accomplished through the use of over-
invoicing, which allows the home country's currency to be 'returned' to the ex-
porting countries, as explained in the following excerpt:
Three separate cases of import over-invoicing can be distinguished in
terms of their relation to the exchange regime. The first is a purely
economic case, where capital flight takes place through false invoicing
only if exchange controls make this necessary. The second case of over-
invoicing arises precisely because of exchange controls. The third cate-
gory occurs irrespective of the exchange regime because the underlying
objective can only be met by declaring a false invoice value.
Low, supra note 5, at 11. In the purely economic case, the motivations for capi-
tal flight may include the desire to protect the value of assets, to increase the
rate of return on assets, and to reduce uncertainty. Id. The second case occurs
because the controls induce the establishment of a parallel exchange market.
Id. at 12. "By over-invoicing their goods, importers can acquire foreign ex-
change for sale in the parallel market so as to capture the scarcity premium on
foreign currency. Id. In the third instance, over-invoicing is the essential way
to accomplish the underlying objective, whether that is the desire to transfer
ownership of assets, avoid direct taxes, declare profits in a different jurisdiction,
or transfer illicit funds. Id.
30. Ajayi, supra note 29, at 546.
31. Low, supra note 5, at 5.
32. Id. However, most contracts for PSI services still do include some capi-
tal flight work. Id.
33. Id. at 13.
[Vol. 7:469474
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3. Reasons for Using Preshipment Inspection
a. Corrupt Customs Officials
Some countries use PSI because they do not trust their own
customs officials to inspect imports fairly and accurately.34 For
example, Indonesia's decision in 1985 to transfer the responsi-
bility of inspecting imports from the Indonesian Customs De-
partment to PSI entities was based in large part on high levels
of corruption within the Customs Department. 35
Customs corruption causes two separate but related types of
problems. First, countries feel that allowing their customs offi-
cials the discretion needed to process imports and exports will
lead to an increase in under-invoicing for duty evasion, over-in-
voicing for money laundering, and smuggling via mis-declara-
tion.36 Second, in many countries customs officials have abused
their power and accepted bribes in exchange for clearing goods
for entrance into the country in a timely manner.37 For exam-
ple, prior to the implementation of preshipment inspection in In-
donesia in 1985, bribes estimated at two million Rupiah per
consignment were often paid by importers to speed up the in-
spections process. 38 As so often happens when officials accept
bribes, the practice becomes both widespread and well-known.
This harms the country in two ways. As the additional cost of
the bribes is factored into the cost of doing business in and with
a country, that country gains a reputation for having a high-cost
and unpredictable business environment. 39 In addition, the de-
lays associated with the corruption slow the movement of goods
through the country's ports, thereby decreasing the country's
34. Richard Borsuk, Changes in Indonesia's Customs Systems Worry Im-
porters Recalling the Old Days, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 1997.
35. Indonesian Firms Wary of Government Decision on Import Inspections,
ASLAN CHEM. NEWS, Feb. 21, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9832233.
36. Frank Reynolds, Country-Specific Documents Satisfy a Requirement of
Buyer's Government, J. COM., Sept. 18, 1996, at 2C. Some of the reasons for
over-invoicing of imports and/or under-invoicing of exports include: (1) capital
flight (protecting asset values, increasing returns to assets, or reducing uncer-
tainty); (2) black market arbitrage; (3) transferring ownership of assets; (4)
evading direct taxes; (5) evading export taxes; and (6) transferring illicit funds.
Low, supra note 5, at 11. Two reasons for under-invoicing of imports and/or
over-invoicing of exports are to evade taxes on imports and to capture export
subsidies. Id.
37. Indonesian Firms Wary of Government Decision on Import Inspections,
supra note 35.
38. Id.
39. Borsuk, supra note 34.
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revenue40 from import duties and decreasing its manufacturing
and production capabilities. 41
b. Lack of Physical Capabilities: Congestion
Many countries lack the physical capabilities to effectively
inspect imports at a rate which facilitates trade.42 These devel-
oping countries often lack essentials such as the funding to run
the costly state-sponsored import inspection, adequate storage
space, administrative buildings, fast and reliable transport sys-
tems, and the large numbers of customs officials needed to effec-
tively inspect imports.43
While some of these countries could conduct post-entry in-
spections, the time imports would spend waiting to pass the in-
spection process as a result of the inadequate physical
capabilities would both impair the individual importer's ability
to do business and decrease the country's overall rate of trade.
The congestion that results from an ill-equipped customs de-
partment can cause imports to stagnate for days or weeks while
the importer waits impatiently for its products to become avail-
able. 44 Inefficiency is one of the major reasons some countries
decide to use PSI. Indeed, it was largely for reasons of trade
facilitation that Indonesia chose to adopt PSI.4 5
B. PROBLEMS WITH PRESHIPMENT INSPECTION
Though many developing countries view PSI as a safe and
manageable way to engage in increasingly higher levels of trade
with other countries, many developed countries view PSI as a
barrier to free trade.46 The use of PSI by developing countries
40. Indonesia was one of the first countries to employ preshipment inspec-
tion in an attempt to facilitate trade. Return of Local Customs Inspections
Feared, JAKARTA POST, Jan. 27, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8100540.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Indonesian Ports Packed and Stacked, But It's Getting Better, EAST
AsiAN ExEc-urvE REP., Mar. 15, 1997, at 7.
44. Prior to 1985, transactions through Indonesian customs typically
meant delays, extra costs, and uncertainty about when importers could expect
their consignments to be released. Id.
45. Id. In fact, the result of Indonesia's decision to hire SGS was a dra-
matic improvement in the movement of goods through Indonesian ports. Bor-
suk, supra note 34. The use of PSI helped to build the country's non-oil exports
and helped boost revenue from import duties. Id.
46. Private Companies' Preshipment Inspection for Caribbean, Latin
America Hit in Sect. 301 Case, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1156 (Sept.
24, 1986).
476 [Vol. 7:469
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began to grow in the 1980s due to their increased concerns about
customs work and capital flight.47 As developing countries in-
creasingly exposed large exporter countries to this system, it be-
came apparent, at least to these large exporters, that PSI had
some serious problems.
1. Complaints about PSI
The first critical discussion of PSI took place in September
of 1982 at the United Nations Economic Commission for Eu-
rope's Working Party on Facilitation of International Procedures
(WP.4).48 The WP.4 adopted a recommendation discouraging
preshipment inspection based mainly on perceived concerns of
increased costs and delays. 49
The PSI debate began in earnest in September 1986, when
four Florida trade groups 50 filed an unfair trade practices com-
plaint with the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) under Sec-
tion 301.5 1 The complaint stated that five Latin American and
47. Low, supra note 5, at 5.
48. Id. at 27.
49. Id. The Discouragement of Preshipment Inspection said the following:
"The present trend towards increased inspection of goods for purposes
other than phytosanitary, sanitary and veterinary controls causes seri-
ous concern because of its implications in the form of costs and delays.
This practice should be discouraged; when there is legitimate need for
inspection the authorities concerned should accept certificates issued
by official control bodies in the country of export."
Id. (citing Recommended Measure 8.2, "Discouragement of Preshipment Inspec-
tion," Item 1.2.9).
50. The four Florida trade groups were the Florida Exporters and Import-
ers Association, the Florida District Export Council, the Florida Customs Bro-
kers and Forwarders Association and the International Center of Florida.
Unsworth, supra note 29, at 1A. PSI companies were also opposed by the New
York Chamber of Commerce, the National Committee on International Trade
Documentation, the Chemical Manufacturers Association, the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association, the Paper Institute, the National Industrial Traffic
League, the National Export Traffic League, the National Association of Export
Management Companies, and the Petroleum Institute. Anthony Barone, Let-
ters to the Editor, Inspection Issue Not Just Regional, J. COM., May 12, 1987, at
1A.
51. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 gives the President, through the
United States Trade Representative (USTR), broad authority to act against the
"unreasonable" and "unjustifiable" trade practices of other countries if these
practices adversely affect United States interests. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (1994).
Section 301 claims are usually initiated by American citizens complaining to
the USTR, who then investigates the complaint and decides what course of ac-
tion to pursue. Section 301(a) gives the USTR the authority to take retaliatory
action if a trading partner breaks a trade agreement with the United States.
Section 301(b), on the other hand, does not require the breach of a trade agree-
ment. This section allows the USTR to take retaliatory action if a trading part-
19981
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Caribbean countries (Jamaica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay,
and Venezuela) were using private companies to perform pre-
shipment inspection on imports from the United States. 52 It
then alleged that the PSI unnecessarily interfered with U.S. ex-
ports to those countries. 53 The complaint further alleged that
the number of countries and associated dollar volume of affected
trade would likely grow because at least eighteen other coun-
tries had also adopted the use of private PSI companies. 54
The Florida trade groups began by noting that the five coun-
tries had signed agreements with PSI companies, predomi-
nantly with SGS, which provided for the physical examination of
the imports and financial analysis of the transaction.55 The four
trade groups complained that if SGS representatives were dis-
satisfied with any part of the transaction, SGS issued a negative
report which had the effect of voiding the contract between the
exporter and the importer.56 The complainants alleged that
since SGS represented twenty-three or more countries, it would
"have unprecedented power to fix the worldwide price of com-
modities, determine product quality standards, and distort
world trade patterns."57 The complaint listed five harms which
U.S. exports suffered as a result of PSI: increased costs and de-
lays, arbitrary price restrictions, the required disclosure of confi-
dential business information to the third party PSI company,
private nullification of contracts without due process rights, and
a competitive disadvantage for the United States resulting from
the fact that domestic trade within PSI-using countries and im-
ports from some third world countries were exempt from pre-
shipment inspection.58
The complaint alleged that the administrative costs of com-
pliance with PSI, costs of the delays associated with PSI, and
ner's actions are "unreasonable" or "discriminatory" and also "burden or restrict
United States commerce." Id. at § 2411(a)(1), 2411(b)(1).
52. Private Companies' Preshipment Inspection, supra note 46, at 1156.
53. Id.
54. Id. Countries other than the five listed in the petition that were using
PSI at the time of the complaint included: Angola, Bolivia, Burundi, Equatorial
Guinea, Ghana, Haiti, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar,
Mexico, Rwanda, Surinam, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia. Action on
Preshipment Inspection Complaints Announced by USTR, Sect. 301 Petition
Withdrawn, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1304-05 (Oct. 29, 1986).
55. Action on Preshipment Inspection Complaints Announced by USTR,
supra note 54, at 1304-05.
56. Id.
57. Private Companies' Preshipment Inspection, supra note 46 (quoting the
section 301 complaint).
58. Id.
[Vol. 7:469
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SGS services' costs surpassed $150 million in increased ex-
penses. 59 The exporters claimed that the delays resulting from
PSI made U.S. exports less attractive than exports from those
countries not subjected to PSI, thus putting U.S. exporters at a
competitive disadvantage.60 Additionally, U.S. exporters were
concerned with perceived arbitrary price restrictions promul-
gated by SGS and an SGS requirement that certain confidential
business information be revealed without any corresponding
guarantees as to how the information would be used.61 It was
argued that the ability of a private PSI company to unilaterally
nullify otherwise valid contracts denied procedural and substan-
tive due process rights such as would be afforded by an appeal
mechanism.6 2 Finally, the exporters stated that existing evi-
dence suggested that the products of third world countries, even
when subject to PSI, received more lenient treatment.63
The petition also claimed that the PSI requirements of the
five named countries violated several GATT obligations, includ-
ing the tariff concessions secured in previous negotiations, 64 the
commitment to reduce the paperwork involved in placing goods
into the commerce of the importing country,65 the elimination of
quotas, 66 and the elimination of discrimination on the basis of
national origin in operating quota and licensing systems. 67
As consequences for the failure to remedy the alleged viola-
tions, the petition asked then President Reagan to consider the
following: suspending the duty-free imports of Jamaican and
Guatemalan goods under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recov-
ery Act,68 suspending the duty-free treatment of imports under
the Generalized System of Preferences for the five countries,
suspending or preventing the application of benefits of trade
agreements with the five countries and imposing retaliatory im-
port restrictions on the five countries. 69 In response to the Sec-
tion 301 unfair trade practices petition, the USTR implemented
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. GATT art. II:l.
65. GATT art. VIII:l(c).
66. GATT art. XI:.
67. GATT art. XIII.
68. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-07 (1994).
69. Action on Preshipment Inspection Complaints Announced by USTR,
supra note 54, at 1304.
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a plan70 to address the concerns of the Florida trade groups. 7 1
The five-point plan committed the USTR to (1) consult with
those governments that used PSI and encourage them to follow
the GATT Customs Valuation Code72; (2) pursue multilateral so-
lutions; (3) monitor the activities of PSI agents in the United
States and look into any U.S. exporters' complaints about the
PSI companies' activities; (4) consider possible legislation, regu-
lations, or other action to limit PSI activities within the United
States; and (5) ask the International Trade Commission (ITC) to
perform a study, pursuant to Section 332, 73 that would report
the effects of PSI practices on U.S. commerce.7 4 In response to
announcement of this plan, the Florida trade groups withdrew
their Section 301 complaint.7 5
70. In conjunction with the announcement of the plan, U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative Clayton Yeutter expressed his concern that PSI requirements im-
peded United States exports to some developing countries. See Actions
Regarding Preshipment Inspection Practices of Private Inspection Companies
on Behalf of Foreign Governments, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,811 (1986).
71. Action on Preshipment Inspection Complaints Announced by USTR,
supra note 54, at 1304.
72. GATT Implementation of Art. VII - Customs Valuation, Apr. 12, 1979,
34 U.S.T. 1151(1), T.I.A.S. No. 10,402 [hereinafter Customs Valuation Code].
73. 19 U.S.C. § 1332, commonly called Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
Section 332 empowers the executive to investigate the customs relations be-
tween the United States and foreign countries. 19 U.S.C. § 1332(b).
74. 40 Percent of Exports Subject to Preshipment Inspection in 1986
Delayed, supra note 24, at 1061.
75. After the Florida trade groups filed their Section 301 complaint, the
issue of preshipment inspection came under more severe scrutiny. At a Na-
tional Association of Export Companies (NEXCO) meeting on November 7,
1986, SGS officials found themselves embroiled in a debate over the fairness of
SGS's preshipment inspection programs. Preshipment Inspection Procedures
Debated by SGS Official, Attorney in Sect 301 Complaint, 3 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 47, at 1418 (Nov. 26, 1986). According to the then Executive Vice
President of SGS, Robert Wareham, the company was under contract with 24
nations in Africa, South America, the Caribbean, and Asia. Id. Wareham ex-
plained SGS's job under these contracts as twofold: physical inspection and
price verification. Id.
Tom Travis, the Miami attorney who had filed the Section 301 complaint
for the four Florida trade groups earlier in that year, accused SGS and other
PSI companies of forcing the disclosure of proprietary business information and
of sabotaging freely negotiated contracts by finding that the price was too high.
Id. Travis explained, "These are non-governmental entities acting like govern-
ments.., but without any established standards." Id. As further evidence of
the magnitude of this problem, Travis stated that after his request for com-
ments regarding his Section 301 complaint, he was flooded with responses from
American corporations who were constrained by the preshipment inspectors.
Id.
In response to Travis' arguments, Wareham stated that his firm's business
had grown out of developing countries' concerns about capital flight. Id. Travis
[Vol. 7:469
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As 1986 ended, more and more exporters began voicing
their complaints about PSI.76 Some companies became so frus-
trated with the PSI process that they stopped exporting to coun-
tries that used it.77 Cincinnati-based Paper Corp. reported that
it no longer shipped its products to Venezuela and it had greatly
reduced its exports to Ecuador. 78
2. International Trade Commission's Report
Pursuant to the USTR's five-point plan, the ITC released a
report entitled "Preshipment Inspection Programs and Their Ef-
fects on U.S. Commerce, on August 17, 1987."79 The report sur-
veyed 600 exporters concerning their experiences with the PSI
responded to this argument by opining that these unacceptable business prac-
tices would be more effectively addressed through customs agreements between
the United States and the countries now employing the services of SGS. Id.
Another dispute arose over Wareham's claim that SGS does not compare
prices across national boundaries on behalf of its clients; instead, the company
only assures that the goods are priced at a level that is reasonable for the coun-
try of origin. Id. This claim was disputed by a number of exporters present at
the meeting who claimed to have personal knowledge to the contrary. Id.
Finally, some exporters questioned why SGS could not conduct its price
review before the contract was signed, instead of the current procedure which
leaves the price review until after the goods are produced and ready for ship-
ment. Id. Wareham responded that such early intervention would be consid-
ered price fixing and that was something in which SGS would not participate.
Id.
76. 40 Percent of Exports Subject to Preshipment Inspection in 1986
Delayed, supra note 24, at 1061.
77. Some Exporters Drop Countries, J. COM., June 12, 1987, at 12A.
78. Id. Judy Stahl, sales service manager for Paper Corp. said, "It's a
headache. We had one shipment ready to export and four weeks went by before
it could be shipped .... And we had to pay the warehousing costs." Id. Ms.
Stahl also reported that French PSI company Bureau Veritas told Paper Corp.
that they were not allowed to make more than a 5% profit on a shipment. Id.
79. 40 Percent of Exports Subject to Preshipment Inspection in 1986
Delayed, supra note 24, at 1061.
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process.8 0 There were 513 responses to the questionnaire, and
the ITC was able to collect data from 401 of those participants.81
Though a number of the responses were incomplete, the ITC
was able to gather a large amount of useful data. The ITC found
that 40 percent of U.S. exports that underwent PSI in 1986 were
delayed by as much as twenty days because of PSI.82 Total ex-
ports from the sampled exporters to the PSI countries in 1986
were valued at $1.6 billion, or 8.2 percent of total U.S. exports to
those countries.8 3
The report stated that in 1986, twenty-five developing coun-
tries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America required PSI of their
imports from the United States and other countries.8 4 Eight of
those countries, Mexico, Venezuela, Indonesia, Ecuador, Ja-
maica, Nigeria, Guatemala, and Haiti, were significant markets
for U.S. exports.8 5 Each of these eight countries adopted their
PSI programs between 1983 and 1986.86
The report cited two main explanations for why so many
countries switched to PSI: the lack of hard currency and the
lack of customs control operations.8 7 The report opined that
these two problems were only exacerbated by the additional
80. The International Trade Commission rejected SGS' May 27, 1987 Free-
dom of Information Act request for access to the list of the exporters receiving
the ITC questionnaires on the practice of preshipment inspection. Keith
Rockwell, Swiss Won't Get List of Exporters in ITC Probe of Cargo Inspection, J.
COM., June 12, 1987, at 1A. According to the assistant general counsel at the
ITC, the application was denied because the release of the list would make it
more difficult to issue a public version of the report and also because the list
had commercial value. Id. The ITC obtained the list of exporters by paying the
Journal of Commerce $5,500.00. Id. Since the ITC paid for the list, it was
under no obligation to make the information on the list public. Id. Though they
could not be sure retaliation was the reason for the request, exporters could
think of no other reason why SGS would want such information. Id. Anthony
Barone, manager for international transportation at Warner Lambert Co. said,
"I can't see any legitimate reason why they would need the names of the compa-
nies. The ITC report will speak for itself." Id. Attorneys for SGS stated that
any charges of retaliation as the reason for the request were completely un-
founded. Id. According to SGS, its intent in asking for the list was simply to
ensure that there was a good balance among the firms questioned. Id. Further-
more, SGS emphasized that it did not want the content of the responses, just
the names of the companies participating in the investigation. Id.
81. 40 Percent of Exports Subject to Preshipment Inspection in 1986
Delayed, supra note 24, at 1061.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1062.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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problems of debt, capital flight, and high levels of fraud and cor-
ruption in the PSI users' foreign trade sectors.88
The majority of U.S. exporters responded negatively to PSI.
Of the 401 respondents, 70 percent said they had strong objec-
tions to PSI based either on the principles of the program8 9 or on
bad experiences with PSI.90 Two-thirds of respondents had spe-
cific complaints about either the qualifications of those officials
actually conducting the inspections, the additional costs occa-
sioned by PSI, or the delays in payments caused by PSI.91 Yet, a
notable 19 percent reported favorable experiences with the PSI
program. 92
Most exporters cited delays as their biggest concern. Ex-
porters reported that regardless of whether or not their ship-
ments were inspected, shipments to PSI-requiring countries
took three times as long, an average of 21 days, as shipments to
those countries not requiring the procedure, which averaged 7
days.9 3 The report acknowledged, however, that the additional
time it took to ship to PSI countries could not necessarily be en-
tirely attributed to the PSI process. 94 Another concern of the
responding exporters was that the invoice prices assessed by the
PSI companies were too high in 3.5 percent of all inspected ship-
ments. 95 The ITC estimated that if all the problems reportedly
associated with PSI were taken together, "the inspection process
would add an additional cost of 2.8 percent of the value of the
shipment to the cost of exporting to that country."96
The president of SGS's government programs division, Rob-
ert Burgess, commented on the ITC report. Though Burgess
criticized the survey of U.S. exporters included in the report,97
88. Id.
89. Some of these objections focused on the alleged hindrance to free trade
caused by PSI and on the release of confidential business information during
inspections. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. "Comparing these two figures provides a good indication of the ad-
ditional length of time required overall for shipping to countries requiring PSI,
but does not represent the additional length of time required for PSI alone.
Other factors may also affect the process of exporting to developing countries
requiring PSI's." Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. "The report relies heavily on a survey of U.S. exporters. We al-
ready know that many exporters prefer that importing countries have
no controls whatsoever. Therefore, the results of the ITC survey are
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he stated that the report demonstrated to U.S. officials why de-
veloping countries viewed preshipment inspection as one impor-
tant way to stop capital flight.98 Yet, the National Federation of
Export Associations president, Ralph Chew, was not persuaded
about the veracity of the claims regarding capital flight. He per-
ceived PSI programs as little more than a phony attempt to pre-
tend that the problem of capital flight was being resolved.99 Mr.
Chew further stated that "the direct and indirect costs of PSI
activities are simply out of proportion with any benefit derived
from them."100
II. THE PRESHIPMENT INSPECTION AGREEMENT AND
THE INDEPENDENT ENTITY
In 1986, as PSI was being criticized, the eighth round of the
GATT multilateral negotiations (the Uruguay Round) was ap-
proaching. Negotiators were faced with weighing the benefits of
PSI for developing countries against the problems and com-
plaints of those who disliked PSI and believed it to be an unfair
barrier to free trade. The Uruguay Round aimed to both further
the tariff concessions secured at previous GATT rounds as well
as to "reduce the non-tariff barriers to trade in goods that had
proliferated as tariff barriers had declined."1 1 These objectives
virtually ensured that PSI and the controversy surrounding it
would become a topic of debate during the Uruguay Round.'0 2
A. EvALUATION OF THE PSI AGREEMENT
The United States approached the preshipment inspection
negotiations of the Uruguay Round with three broad objectives.
First, the United States wanted to draft an agreement that
would regulate the activities of PSI companies. 10 3 Second, the
not particularly new, nor are they unexpected. The fact is, however,
that while there were delays in 1986, in 1987 delays have virtually
been eliminated for U.S. PSI shippers."
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Catherine Curtiss & Kathryn C. Atkinson, United States-Latin Ameri-
can Trade Laws, 21 N.C. J. INV'L LAw & COM. REG. 111, 114 (1995).
102. PSI was placed on the GAIT negotiating agenda in February of 1988.
Low, supra note 5, at 32. The formal proposal to include PSI on the agenda
came from Indonesia. As a PSI-using country, Indonesia worried that "over-
zealous regulation of PSI at the national level in the exporting country could
frustrate the objectives of PSI programs." Id.
103. Daniel E. Gardner, Agreement on Preshipment Inspection; Negotiations
in the Uruguay Round of the GATT, 115 Bus. AM. 24 (Jan. 1994).
484 [Vol. 7:469
PRESHIPMENT INSPECTION4
United States sought to eliminate, or at least reduce, the trade
impediments that U.S. exporters were experiencing as a result
of developing countries' use of PSI.10 4 A final objective was to
develop a dispute settlement mechanism that could quickly re-
solve disputes between PSI companies and U.S. exporters.
10 5
After seven years of negotiations, the Final Act of the Uru-
guay Round was approved on December 15, 1993.106 Included in
the Final Act as one of the annexed agreements was the Agree-
ment on Preshipment Inspection.10 7
1. Structure and Notable Elements of the PSI Agreement
The PSI Agreement is broken down into nine articles. Arti-
cle 1, the definitions section, explains all the necessary terms.
Article 2, the heart of the Agreement, lists and defines all the
obligations of User Members.' 08 Article 3 lists the obligations of
Exporter Members. 10 9 Article 4 establishes a review procedure
to expedite the resolution of grievances or disputes that cannot
be resolved bilaterally. Articles 5 through 9 address the topics of
notification, review of the Agreement, consultation regarding
matters affecting the Agreement, settlement of disputes about
the Agreement itself, and miscellaneous final provisions.
All nine Articles are informed by the preambular language.
The first paragraph of the Preamble states the three broad goals
of the Uruguay Round: to bring about further liberalization and
expansion of trade, to strengthen the role of GATT, and to in-
crease the responsiveness of the GATT system to the evolving
international economic environment. 1 0 However, the PSI
Agreement tempers these ambitious goals with the recognition
that a number of developing countries still must utilize the PSI
system."'' The Preamble clearly implies that PSI is not a per-
manent solution, by stating that PSI will be recognized "for as
long and insofar as it is necessary to verify the quality, quantity
or price of imported goods." 1 2 Though the temporary nature of
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. GATT, supra note 2.
107. PSI Agreement, supra note 1.
108. A "User Member" is defined as "a member of which the government or
any government body contracts for or mandates the use of preshipment inspec-
tion activities." Id. art. 1.
109. Id. art. 3.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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PSI is strongly implied, the Agreement never identifies any
guidelines or timelines to determine when a country has devel-
oped the resources and infrastructure that would allow it to stop
using PSI and instead rely on its own customs agency.
A second key element of the PSI Agreement is the non-dis-
crimination principle. 113 This principle, set forth in Article 2.1
of the Agreement, is different than GATT's most-favored-nation
principle. 114 While non-discrimination under Article 2.1 calls
for the non-discriminatory application of preshipment inspec-
tion, it does not require that all exporters be treated in the same
manner."15 As long as the criteria for inclusion and exclusion
are objective, some products may be excluded from PSI.116 The
question Article 2.1 leaves unanswered is whether particular
producers can be excluded, while others are included, on the
same basis. Some believe that the text of the Article suggests
they can.
A third noteworthy aspect of the PSI Agreement is that it
explicitly excludes customs valuation from the mandates of the
Agreement. 117 Customs valuation will continue to be addressed
by the WTO's rules on customs valuation."18 This is partly a
result of the Agreement's focus on addressing exporters' con-
cerns and capital flight rather than on the newer customs
issues. "9
Another important feature of the PSI Agreement is the in-
dependent dispute resolution procedure of Article 4. This Arti-
cle, discussed in detail later, establishes procedures for an
independent review of a PSI company's decisions. The decisions
resulting from the independent review are binding on the par-
ties to the dispute.' 20 The PSI Agreement's independent review
process is "unprecedented in GATT terms, since it involves a dis-
pute settlement procedure in which both protagonists are pri-
vate entities." 121
113. Id. art. 2.1.
114. GATT art. I.
115. PSI Agreement art. 2.1.
116. Id.
117. Id. at n.4.
118. See Customs Valuation Code, supra note 72.
119. Low, supra note 5, at 33.
120. PSI Agreement art. 4(h).
121. Low, supra note 5, at 35.
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2. Exporter Complaints and the Related PSI Provisions
The PSI Agreement addresses many of the major concerns
U.S. exporters had on the eve of the Uruguay Round. Article 2
addresses most of these concerns. As Article 2's title, "Obliga-
tions of User Members," indicates, User Members must ensure
that their PSI entities comply with the Agreements' mandates.
The most important articles are those on non-discrimination,
transparency, protection of confidential business information,
conflicts lof interest, delays, price verification, appeals proce-
dures, and derogation.
a. Non-discrimination
Article 2.1 states that User Members must ensure that PSI
is carried out in a non-discriminatory manner.1 22 This Article
was designed to address PSI companies' alleged discrimination
among countries and exporters. Non-discrimination, a basic
principle underlying all aspects of the GATT/WTO Agreement,
"means that signatories may not apply measures that disadvan-
tage imports relative either to each other or to national prod-
ucts." 12 3 Not only must the procedures and criteria of PSI be
objective and equally applied, but User Members must also en-
sure that inspection is uniform. 124
b. Transparency
Articles 2.5-2.8 deal with exporters' concerns about trans-
parency. Transparency means that the measures and proce-
dures affecting trade must be made known to those who will be
affected by them, in this case through notice and publication of
the standards and procedures.' 25 Specifically, these provisions
require that PSI entities provide exporters with a list of all the
information that is necessary for compliance with the require-
ments, convenient access to the information, and prompt notice
of any changes or additions to PSI activities.' 26
122. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text (discussing the differ-
ence between the non-discrimination principle of Article 2.1 of the PSI Agree-
ment and the GATTs most-favored-nation principle).
123. Curtiss & Atkinson, supra note 101, at 116.
124. PSI Agreement art. 2.1.
125. Curtiss & Atkinson, supra note 101, at 117-18.
126. PSI Agreement art. 2.5-2.8.
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c. Confidentiality
Another important exporter concern focuses on PSI compa-
nies' requests for the disclosure of confidential business informa-
tion to be used in their physical and price verifications. Though
exporters provided no concrete examples of the misuse of such
information, they frequently voiced this concern in pre-Agree-
ment discussions. 127
The Agreement deals with this concern in two ways: by
holding PSI companies accountable for the manner in which
they handle the confidential information and by restricting the
types of information that PSI companies can request from ex-
porters.128 User Members' basic obligation under these sections
is to treat all information received in the course of PSI as confi-
dential business information unless the information is not al-
ready published, is generally available to third parties, or is
otherwise available in the public domain. 29 For the informa-
tion that must be provided, the User Members shall, upon re-
quest, disclose the measures they are taking to ensure the
mandated confidentiality. The Member is not required, how-
ever, to disclose confidential information that would jeopardize
the effectiveness of the PSI program or prejudice the legitimate
commercial interests of particular enterprises. 30 User Mem-
bers are under an obligation to ensure that no confidential infor-
mation is divulged to any third parties except those with which
the PSI contract was made.' 3 ' Even the sharing of information
with the contracting party, the User Member, must be limited to
information that is usually required for letters of credit or other
forms of payment, for customs, for import licensing, or for ex-
change control purposes. 1 32
All the above requirements relate to the information that
parties may properly request. As a further precaution, Article
2.12 enumerates the types of information that User Members
must ensure PSI entities do not request. These include manu-
facturing data relating to patented, licensed, or undisclosed
processes, unpublished technical data that is unnecessary for
demonstration of technical compliance, internal pricing data,
127. 40 Percent of Exports Subject to Preshipment Inspection in 1986
Delayed, supra note 24, at 1062.
128. PSI Agreement art. 2.9-2.13.
129. Id.
130. Id. art. 2.10.
131. Id. art. 2.11.
132. Id.
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data relating to profit margins, and contract terms not relevant
to the inspection. 133
d. Conflicts of Interest
Article 2.14 binds User Members to ensure that PSI entities
maintain procedures to avoid conflicts of interest in three partic-
ular situations. Conflicts of interest are to be avoided between
(1) PSI and any related entities of the PSI entities (with an eye
toward possible financial conflicts of interest), (2) PSI companies
and any other entities (including other entities subject to PSI),
and (3) divisions of PSI entities engaged in activities other than
the inspection process (for example, appraisal services). 134
e. Delays
Delays caused by PSI were another point of contention for
exporters. Articles 2.15-2.19 address the issue of delays. User
Members must ensure that PSI companies avoid unreasonable
delays in the inspection of shipments. 135 Article 2.15 specifically
addresses the timing of the inspection. The inspection date is
mutually agreed upon between the PSI entity and the ex-
porter.' 36 Failure of the inspection to occur on the prescribed
date, can only be for one of three reasons: (1) the inspection has
been rescheduled on a mutually agreed basis, (2) the exporter
prevents the PSI entity from doing the inspection, or (3) force
majeure.137 To further prevent delay, User Members must
make certain that PSI companies issue their Clean Report of
Findings 38 or "provide a detailed written explanation specifying
the reasons for non-issuance" within five days following the re-
ceipt of the final documents and the completion of the inspec-
tion.139 In the case of reports recommending non-issuance, the
PSI company must give exporters the opportunity to present
their views in writing and, if they desire, arrange for re-inspec-
tion on a mutually convenient date. 140
133. Id. art. 2.12.
134. Id. art. 2.14.
135. Id. art. 2.15.
136. Id. art. 2.15.
137. Footnote three to the PSI Agreement defines force majeure as "irresisti-
ble compulsion or coercion, unforeseeable course of events excusing from fulfill-
ment of contract." Id. at n.3.
138. Id. at 2.18-19. See also supra note 18 and accompanying text (describ-
ing a Report of Findings).
139. PSI Agreement art. 2.16.
140. Id.
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f. Preliminary Price Verification
Article 2.17 addresses the exporters' suggestion that PSI
companies check the sufficiency of the price before all the goods
are produced. 141 This Article seeks to prevent a scenario where
a price dispute cannot be resolved and the deal subsequently
falls through, leaving the exporter with the goods and no buyer
for them. It provides that upon the exporter's request, prelimi-
nary verification of price and, where applicable, of currency ex-
change rate will take place prior to the date of physical
inspection. 142 This kind of preliminary inspection is undertaken
based on the contract between the exporter and importer, the
pro forma invoice, and the import authorization. 143 Subsequent
to this inspection, and provided that the goods are in conformity
with import documentation, the User Member must ensure that
the price or currency exchange rate that has been accepted is not
withdrawn.144
g. Price Methodologies
A large number of exporters also complained of the use of
inadequate price methodologies in the price verification stage.
There were two basic pricing complaints. The first related to al-
lowable price differences, and the factors that should be consid-
ered in accounting for the differences between an invoice price
and the PSI company's notion of the comparable export price. 145
The second pricing complaint dealt with establishing which
markets could be used in the price comparison analysis. 146
Article 2.20, entitled "Price Verification," 147 attempts to ad-
dress this complaint. This Article obligates User Members to at-
tempt to prevent over- and under-invoicing and fraud by
ensuring the use of a number of guidelines in making price ver-
ifications. 148 A PSI company may reject a contract price only if
it can demonstrate that its findings of an unsatisfactory price
are based on a verification process that conforms with the fol-
lowing criteria. 149 The price comparison must be based on the
prices of identical or similar goods offered for export from the
141. Id. art. 2.17.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Low, supra note 5, at 38.
146. Id.
147. PSI Agreement art. 2.20.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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same country of exportation at or about the same time, under
competitive and comparable conditions of sale.'50 Specifically,
the PSI company may use only prices that provide a valid basis
for comparison, shall not rely on the price of goods offered for
export to different countries of importation to unjustifiably lower
the price of the shipment, shall make appropriate allowances for
the terms of the sales contract and for the applicable adjusting
factors,' 5 ' and at any stage in the process, shall provide the ex-
porter with an opportunity to explain the price. 152 In addition,
provisions of Article 2.20 address the verification of transporta-
tion charges and list factors that may not be used for price verifi-
cation purposes.' 5 3
h. Appeals Procedure
Article 2.21 sets forth an appeals procedure. Like Article
2.17, this Article addresses the situation in which an aggrieved
exporter is left without recourse or an appeals procedure. Arti-
cle 2.21 compels User Members to make certain that PSI enti-
ties establish procedures to receive, consider, and decide
exporters' grievances.15 4 This Article also requires that infor-
mation concerning these procedures be made available to ex-
porters. '5 5 PSI companies must have at least one official in each
city with a PSI office available during business hours to consider
exporters' complaints.' 56 In order to use the appeals procedure,
exporters must provide the official with a written summary of
the facts concerning the specific transaction, the nature of their
grievance, and a suggested solution.'57 The duty of the official is
to "afford sympathetic consideration to the exporters' griev-
ances" and render a decision as soon as possible.' 58
150. Id. art. 2.20(b).
151. The adjusting factors pertaining to the transaction include but are not
limited to the commercial level and quantity of the sale, delivery periods and
conditions, price escalation clauses, quality specifications, special design fea-
tures, special shipping or packing specifications, order size, spot sales, seasonal
influences, license or other intellectual property fees, and services rendered as
part of the contract if these are not customarily invoiced separately, and certain
elements relating to the exporter's price, such as the contractual relationship
between exporter and importer. Id. art. 2.20(c).
152. Id. art. 2.20(b).
153. Id. art. 2.20(2)-(e).
154. Id. art. 2.21.
155. Id.
156. Id. art. 2.21(a)-(b).
157. Id. art. 2.21(b).
158. Id. art. 2.21(c).
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i. Derogation
The final section of Article Two deals with derogation. Arti-
cle 2.22 states that with the exception of part shipments, ship-
ments whose value is less than a certain minimum value to be
specified by User Members shall not be inspected. 159 This mini-
mum value is part of the information that PSI entities must pro-
vide to exporters pursuant to Article 2.6.160
j. Exporter Member Obligations
Article Three of the PSI Agreement states the obligations of
Exporter Members. Exporters must ensure that their laws and
regulations addressing PSI are applied in a non-discriminatory
and transparent manner. 161 All laws and regulations must be
published promptly and in a manner that allows relevant par-
ties to become familiar with them.162
B. OPERATION OF THE INDEPENDENT ENTITY
Article Four provides for the creation and operation of the
Independent Entity (IE), 163 which became operational through
the agreement of the General Council on December 13, 1995.164
The purpose of the Independent Entity is to hear and decide dis-
putes between exporters and PSI entities that could not be re-
solved either bilaterally or through the internal appeals
procedure mandated by Article 2.21.165
The IE is composed jointly of an organization representing
PSI entities, the International Federation of Inspection Agencies
(IFIA) and an organization representing exporters, the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce (ICC).' 6 6 The IE was established
159. Id. art. 2.22.
160. Id.
161. Id. art. 3.1.
162. Id.
163. Id. art. 4.
164. World Trade Organization, Operation of the Independent Entity Estab-
lished Under Article 4 of the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, Decision of
13 December 1995 (visited Feb. 13, 1998) <httpJ/www.wto.org/new/psidoc.htm>
[hereinafter Operation of IE].
165. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text (discussing the PSI
Agreement's appeals procedure).
166. Operation of IE, supra note 164.
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as a subsidiary body of the Council of Trade in Goods, 167 to
which it is required to report at least once a year.168
The WTO was entrusted with the responsibility of establish-
ing the IE 169 and determining the rules of procedure for the in-
dependent reviews. 170 The WTO was also given leave to amend
both the structure and functioning of the IE, should the need
arise. 171
Independent review by the IE is limited to establishing
whether the parties to the dispute have complied with the provi-
sions of the PSI Agreement in the course of the inspection.172
Independent review is available only after the exporter has first
submitted a complaint to the PSI entity according to the appeals
procedure outlined in Article 2.21 of the PSI Agreement. 73 In
fact, an exporter may not request independent review earlier
than two working days after the dispute was submitted to the
PSI entity's internal appeals procedure. 174
In order to seek an independent review, the complainant
must submit a completed Standard Application Form to the
IE. 17 5 The IE must submit a copy of the request and all the ac-
167. At the top of the governing structure of the WTO is a Ministerial Con-
ference which meets at least every two years. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALUS, AND
TEXT 304 (3d ed. 1995). Below the Ministerial Conference in the governing
structure there are four "Councils." Id. The General Council, which has overall
supervisory authority, carries out the functions of the Ministerial Conference
between Ministerial Conference sessions. Id. The Council for Trade in Goods,
Council for Trade in Services, and Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights are the three remaining councils, one for each of the An-
nex 1 agreements. Id.
168. Operation of IE, supra note 164.
169. Id. annex l(1).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. annex 111(1.2).
173. Id. annex III (2.2).
174. Id. annex III (2.3).
175. The Standard Application Form may be submitted in any of the lan-
guages of the WTO and must include the following information: the identity of
the complainant, address, telephone number, and a contact person in the com-
plainant's office; the name and address of the importer; the name and address
of the respondent; PSI inspection entity reference numbers and exporters' con-
tract, order, or invoice numbers; a brief description of the goods; an indication of
the provisions of the PSI Agreement which have allegedly been violated and a
description of the elements on the basis of which it is alleged that the infringe-
ment took place; copies of all relevant documents; details of the submission of
the dispute to the PSI entity's internal appeal procedure; complainant's state-
ment as to whether it prefers the dispute to be determined by a single in-
dependent trade expert or a three-member panel. Id. annex 111(4).
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companying documents to the respondent for its review. 176 The
respondent may submit a reply to the IE on the Standard Re-
sponse Form. 177 In order to facilitate a reasoned evaluation of
the matter, the response includes a statement of the respon-
dent's position with respect to the dispute, as well as any other
evidence or material the respondent deems relevant. 178 The IE
must then send a copy of the respondent's reply to the complain-
ant. Neither party may submit any further information unless
the independent review panel requests it.' 7 9
Either a single expert or a panel of three experts performs
the independent review. The IE must establish and annually
update a publicly available list of experts which is divided into
three sections.' 80 One section of the experts is nominated by the
ICC, another by the IFIA, and the final section of independent
trade experts by the IE itself.181 If the complainant requests
that a single independent trade expert decide the matter, then
the respondent is obligated to state in its reply whether or not it
concurs with this request.' 8 2 Irrespective of whether the parties
have agreed upon the use of a single expert or a panel, upon
receipt of all the required materials the IE will appoint a single
independent expert from the independent trade experts section
of the IE list.'8 3 If the PSI entity and the exporter cannot agree
to use a single expert, this independent trade expert will become
the chairperson of the three-member panel. If a three-member
panel is being used, the respondent and complainant each pro-
vide the names of three trade experts from their section of the
list.184
The IE completes the panel by selecting one expert to repre-
sent the exporter from the three names submitted by the ex-
porter and one expert from the three names submitted by the
PSI entity. In the selection of the single independent trade ex-
pert or the three-member panel, the location of the experts and
of the parties, as well as the site of inspection of the goods, are
all factors to be considered. 185
176. Id. annex 111(4.3).
177. Id. annex 111(4.4).
178. Id.
179. Id. annex 111(4.5).
180. Id. annex 111(4.2.10).
181. Id.
182. Id. annex 111(3).
183. Id. annex 111(3.1).
184. Id. annex 111(5.1).
185. Id. annex 111(5.3).
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Since the expert or experts facilitating the independent re-
view must be compensated, as well as given the resources to ac-
complish the review, a source of financing is necessary. Advance
deposits from both the exporter and the PSI entity finance the
independent review process. In order to expedite the initiation
of independent reviews, each PSI entity must arrange an auto-
matically renewable bank guarantee to cover the initial costs of
one independent review.18 6 Termed the Advance Deposit Tariff,
this money is used to pay the fees for the service of three panel-
ists for eight days, lump sums for communication costs, and
WTO overhead costs.' s7 Any party that has not completed this
procedure is required to deposit the necessary funds into an IE
bank account at the same time the application for independent
review is submitted.' 8 Unless both parties have either depos-
ited the funds into an IE bank account or maintained an ad-
vance bank guarantee, the independent review will not be
commenced. 189
The independent panel will base its decisions on the written
submissions of the parties, supplemented by any subsequent
oral arguments.190 The review of the independent panel is lim-
ited, however, in that parties may not raise issues before the
panel that were not previously raised in the internal appeals
procedure. 191 If a party fails to either participate in the proceed-
ings or respond in a timely manner to panel requests, the panel
will nonetheless render its decision based on the information
before it. 192 Although two of the members of each three-member
panel were nominated by the parties, each panelist is forbidden
from acting as an advocate or agent for either of the disputing
parties. Instead, panelists must act as independent
adjudicators. 193
IE procedures mandate that submissions and other materi-
als provided to the panel or otherwise reviewed in the course of
the proceeding be held in strict confidence by both panelists and
186. Id. annex 111(6.1).
187. Id.
188. Id. annex II(6.1).
189. This procedure is subject to one exception. See id. annex 111(6.3.2) (ex-
plaining that notwithstanding the requirements of Annex 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3.1, a
panel shall be established upon receipt of a deposit or bank guarantee by only
one party, provided that the amount is sufficient, subject to the prior agreement
of that party).
190. Id. annex 111(7.1).
191. Id.
192. Id. annex III(7.3).
193. Id. annex 111(7.6).
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disputing parties.194 As a further safeguard for confidentiality,
a party can request that certain information submitted to the
panel be treated as confidential if it submits a summary of the
information.' 95
A three-member panel arrives at its decision by a majority
vote. 196 IE procedures mandate that each decision be rendered
within eight working days after the IE received the request for
independent review, unless both parties agree to an exten-
sion.197 The decision must state whether or not the panel be-
lieves the parties have complied with the relevant PSI
Agreement provisions and be accompanied by a brief explana-
tion of the rationale behind the decision.' 98 Panels issue their
decisions in both a secret form and a non-confidential form. 199
The former is maintained strictly in the IE confidential rec-
ord.200 The latter version is issued for publication by the IFIA
and ICC and is available to PSI entities and exporters. 20 '
At the conclusion of the independent review, the IE
prepares a final financial account of the case. 20 2 The panel then
apportions the costs based upon the merits of the review.20 3
The panel decisions are binding upon both the preshipment
inspection entity and the exporter.204 This type of dispute reso-
lution is unparalleled in GATT jurisprudence because the dis-
pute settlement procedure involves two parties that are private
entities.
III. COUNTRY APPLICATION: INDONESIA
Many developing countries are faced with the question of
whether to employ PSI for customs work. Indonesia's experi-
ence, as the first country to do so, followed by its subsequent
attempt to operate without PSI, is particularly instructive. Ex-
amination of Indonesia's situation before their adoption of PSI
reveals some of the common problems suffered by developing
countries. Analysis of Indonesia's trade situation after adoption
194. Id. annex 111(9.1).
195. Id. annex 111(9.2).
196. Id. annex III(10.1).
197. Id. annex 111(10.2).
198. Id. annex 111(10.3).
199. Id. annex 111(10.6).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. annex 111(10.5).
203. Id.
204. PSI Agreement art. 4(h).
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of PSI demonstrates both the effectiveness and addictiveness of
PSI. Finally, the national and international debate sparked by
Indonesia's decision to abandon PSI in favor of port-of-unloading
inspection highlights the arguments both for and against long
term PSI utilization.
A. PSI COMES TO INDONESIA
In 1985, Indonesia was the first country to hire SGS to han-
dle its customs work. 20 5 Several factors motivated the Indone-
sian officials' decision. Government officials desired to take the
responsibility for customs valuation away from Indonesia's own
corruption-infested Customs Department.20 6 Corruption in the
Indonesian Customs Department had caused congested ports,
endless paperwork, unjustifiable delays, and customs kickbacks
and bribes. 20 7 This rampant corruption fostered the perception
that Indonesia's business climate was expensive and uncertain,
deterring trade. The adoption of PSI was also intended to allevi-
ate congestion and help facilitate the movement of goods, which
would ostensibly help facilitate trade.208 Imports remained in
the ports for days and sometimes weeks waiting for clearance
from customs officials. These delays led to extra costs and
uncertainty. 209
Indonesia's decision 210 to contract out its customs work
proved to be an excellent one. The PSI system "dramatically im-
proved the movement of goods through Indonesian ports, help-
ing build up the country's non-oil exports and boosting the
government revenue from import duties."211 In addition, foreign
businesses were no longer faced with the prospect of dealing
with corruption as a necessary element of doing business with
Indonesia; it is reasonable to infer that this increased the will-
ingness of foreigners to deal with Indonesian parties.
205. Low, supra note 5, at 5.
206. Kadin Asks for Transition Period for Customs Law, JAKARTA POST, Feb.
17, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
207. Id.
208. Return of Local Customs Inspections Feared, supra note 40.
209. Id.
210. Although Indonesia modified its relatonship with SGS in 1991, making
it a subcontractor to the state-owned PT Surveyer Indonesia, its use of SGS to
do PSI was basically consistent from 1985 to 1997. Id.
211. Borsuk, supra note 34.
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B. THE DEBATE: PSI OR A RETURN TO PORT-OF-
UNLOADING INSPECTION?
The PSI system largely alleviated the primary problems of
congestion and corruption. Having enjoyed such success with
the PSI system, Indonesian and foreign business people were
distressed to learn in January 1997 that the Indonesian govern-
ment was considering abolishing its use of PSI and returning
customs work to the Customs Department.212 A new customs
law was being developed by the Indonesian government, and the
shift would take effect in April 1997.
The impending decision sparked a national and interna-
tional debate. Indonesian and foreign business people feared
that abolishing PSI would return Indonesia to its pre-1985 state
of congestion and corruption.213 Business people preferred PSI
because it had already proven it could guarantee the smooth and
fast flow of imports into Indonesia. 214
Of major concern to those opposed to PSI abolition was the
mentality of the Customs Department. Many claimed that cus-
toms officials' tendencies had not changed since the corrupt pre-
PSI days.215 Although PSI had lessened the effect of corruption
on Indonesian imports and exports, corruption was still re-
garded as being endemic in the Indonesian civil service gener-
ally.216 A 1996 study ranked Indonesia as the tenth most
corrupt of fifty-four developing and developed countries. 217
Many businesses were not convinced that the Customs De-
partment would avoid this corruption.218 Business people
feared that underpaid civil servants, including front-line cus-
toms officials, would be unable to resist bribes and corruption.
219
212. Return of Local Customs Inspections Feared, supra note 40.
213. Id.
214. Germany Worried About New Gov't Ruling on Customs, JAKARTA POST,
Feb. 27, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
215. Kadin Asks for Transition Period for Customs Law, supra note 206, at
1.
216. Importers Want Longer Customs Law Transition Period, JAKARTA POST,
Feb. 21, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
217. Return of Local Customs Inspections Feared, supra note 40. The study
was conducted by the Berlin-based Transparency International. Id. The study
was used by the London-based Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) in its study of
the implementation of the new Indonesian customs law. Though the report rec-
ognized that PSI had some shortcomings, the report praised PSI highly for its
valuable contribution to improving the efficiency of Indonesian trade. Low-Paid
Customs Officials Could Hinder Trade, JAKARTA POST, Mar. 20, 1997, at 1,
available in News Library, Curnws File.
218. Low-Paid Customs Officials Could Hinder Trade, supra note 217, at 1.
219. Id.
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Around the same time, the World Customs Organization (WCO)
also warned of the dangers of overworked and underpaid cus-
toms officials and the negative effect those officials could have on
a country's international trade.220
In addition, business people were concerned that the return
to port-of-unloading inspection would increase the costs of im-
porting and cause delays in import flows, thereby critically re-
ducing the flow of trade.221 This flow reduction would be
disastrous for Indonesia because imports were vital to its econ-
omy. For example, the manufacturing industry depended
largely on imported materials and intermediate goods, and Indo-
nesian investment projects relied almost totally on imported
capital goods. 222
The Indonesian Director-General of Customs and Excise
characterized these worries as "unfounded."223 He argued that
the new system, which relied on shippers sending cargo data to
customs officials via computer, would prevent the congestion
from occurring. 224 Though not denying that there would be
some corruption, the Director-General stated that the problems
with corruption would be considerably reduced due to training, a
higher caliber of staff, and the "phasing out of those who had the
old habit."225 Furthermore, the Director-General believed re-
turning to port-of-unloading inspection would be good for na-
tional prestige and would save the government almost $100
million annually which would otherwise be paid to the PSI en-
tity for the import inspection services. 226
Fearing that these proposed improvements to the Customs
Department would prove inadequate, the Indonesian Chamber
of Commerce and Industry and Indonesian Importers Associa-
tion requested a transition period of at least three to six months
before the new laws would be fully enforced. 227 The Associa-
tion's chairman, Mr. Saud, did not want the new law fully en-
forced until 2003. In the interim, he proposed that importers
220. Id.
221. Development Goes On, JAKARTA POST, Apr. 3, 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File.
222. Id.
223. Return of Local Customs Inspections Feared, supra note 40.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Importers Want Longer Customs Law Transition Period, supra note
216.
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should be able to choose which system, PSI or on-arrival inspec-
tion, would apply to their imports. 228
C. THE SITUATION AFrER ABANDONING PSI
The Indonesian government returned the responsibility for
customs work to the Indonesian Customs Department and the
new procedures took effect 229 on April 1, 1997.230 The new cus-
toms procedures presently involve: (1) self-assessment on duties
and taxes due, (2) on-arrival inspections, and (3) post-release
audit.23 1
In the new system, importers are categorized into "green
light" and "red light" groups. 232 Those in the green light group
enjoy the smooth flow of their documents and goods, while those
in the red light group face a physical inspection without price
verification. 233 However, green light importers will undergo
random inspections to keep the importers honest and prevent
corruption. 234 The system allows importers to make a self-as-
sessment on the tariffs, included in the documents they send to
the Customs Office. Under the new law, the verification proce-
dures are largely paperless, due to the system's reliance on an
Electronic Data Interchange System (EDI) and only highly se-
lective physical inspections. 235 As a final protection, the Cus-
toms Office has a two year period following the arrival of the
imported goods to conduct a post audit inspection. 236
At the end of April 1997, however, cargo flows through Indo-
nesian ports remained slow, resulting in higher handling and
228. Id. Mr. Saud also stated that during the transition period, those im-
porters choosing to use the PSI system for their imports should pay all the in-
spection fees. Id.
229. After the decision to proceed with full enforcement of the law upon im-
plementation, worried importers of textiles, footwear, plastic and steel began
stockpiling six months of supplies, believing that the implementation of the
new customs law would hinder the flow of imports for some time. RI Customs
Law Triggers Panic, JAKARTA POST, Mar. 18, 1997, at 13, available in 1997 WL
10016156. Stockpiling for such a length of time is unusual; importers usually
stockpile for no more than three months due to the costs. Id.
230. Restoring Images, Imposing Law on Customs Procedures, INDoNESIAN
NAT'L NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 4, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9775447. The return
to port-of-unloading inspection was accomplished through Indonesian Law No.
10/1995. Id.
231. RI Customs Law Triggers Panic, supra note 229, at 13.
232. Restoring Images, supra note 230.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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storage costs. 23 7 By May 15, 1997, just six weeks after the Cus-
toms Department resumed control of the ports, "the ports were
packed and stacked," and "overflowing with containers."238
Though clearance times had increased to five to seven days from
a previous time frame of twenty-four to seventy-two hours, im-
porters reported that things were improving.239 The Customs
Department and importers shared the blame for the congestion,
which seemed to be the result of three factors: (1) unprepared
importers and customs officials, (2) a higher than average flow of
imports, and (3) the ports' already strained infrastructure. 240
Lack of computer skills of both importers and customs offi-
cials proved to be a key problem. 24 ' The new system relied on
the use of computers and an electronic data interchange system
to facilitate the fast and easy flow of imports. 242 One month af-
ter the implementation of the new system, though, "only five
percent of importers are using EDI, 30 percent submit documen-
tation on computer diskettes, while 65 percent still process the
paperwork manually."243 The increase in import flows, com-
bined with delays in processing documents and customs clear-
ance, led to congestion in the container yard and higher storage
costs for importers. 244 The increased import volumes also
strained the customs infrastructure and the inefficient truck
fleet. 24 5 Though the immediate effects of the new regulations
were largely negative, optimism remained that imports would
flow more smoothly as both importers and customs officials
gained experience with the system. 246
As time went on and the situation did not improve, the par-
ties began placing the blame on themselves and each other. The
Indonesian customs director stated that the customs office
would be unable to speed up the clearance of goods without help
from banks, customs brokers and the port authority.24 7 In addi-
237. Complaints About New Customs Service Start, JAKARTA POST, Apr. 29,
1997, available in 1997 WL 10557046.
238. Indonesian Ports Packed and Stacked, supra note 43, at 7.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. The main container yard, which operated at 60 percent capacity
before the new regulations were implemented, was operating at 90 percent ca-
pacity after the implementation of the new customs law. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Customs Director Vows to Improve Service, JAKARTA POST, May 9, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 10557714.
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tion, the customs service blamed the importers' unwillingness to
use EDI for the pile-ups.248 Meanwhile, importers and customs
brokers blamed the slow processing of customs documents for
the slow movement of goods, and the state-owned port manage-
ment company blamed inadequate customs clearance for the
problems.249 After little more than six weeks with the new sys-
tem, local concern was rampant and foreign export groups were
holding conferences to discuss placing the issue of delays on
their watch lists.250
By June of 1997, perspectives on the causes of the customs
problems were shifting. According to some, the difficulties ex-
perienced were not due to "'honest' mistakes inherent in a learn-
ing process" but to abuses of authority by customs officials. 251
Importers complained that the costs of clearing goods through
ports kept increasing because customs and port officials, without
the consent of the importers, would arbitrarily order that con-
tainers be transferred from the port customs area to private
storage depots. 252 This procedure cost importers approximately
$205 per container per day in storage fees, excluding trucking
costs. 25 3 Analysts and business people feared that the private
storage depot owners and the customs officials were conspiring
together. 254 Though recognizing that ten weeks was perhaps
not long enough for a rigorous assessment of the new system,
those dissatisfied with the new system renewed their cries for
the government to review the system before permanent damage
was done to the Indonesian economy.255
It remains to be seen how the Indonesian government will
respond to the cries for reevaluation of the new port-of-unload-
ing system. That the debate over PSI is a timely and important
issue is demonstrated by the possibility that the controversy
over PSI elimination, and the effects of its elimination, contrib-
uted to the recent economic collapse in Indonesia. Regardless,
Indonesia's experience with PSI is surely instructive to other de-
248. Customs Told Port Pile-Up Could Affect Trade, JAKARTA POST, May 20,
1997, available in 1997 WL 11061143.
249. Customs Director Vows to Improve Service, supra note 247.
250. Customs Told Port Pile-Up Could Affect Trade, supra note 248.
251. Customs Hurdles Resurge, JAKARTA POST, June 11, 1997, available in
1997 WL 11478837.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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veloping countries who are contemplating either the adoption or
the elimination of PSI in their own country.
IV. THE FUTURE OF PSI
A. PSI ENTITY OFFICIAL'S PERSPECTIVE
According to SGS, PSI's utility in facilitating trade and aid-
ing in the development of third world nations remains as viable
today as it was in 1965 and subsequent years. 256 SGS main-
tains that although it presently complies with the Agreement on
Preshipment Inspection, it acted within the Agreement's param-
eters well before the implementation of the Agreement.257 SGS
continues to see PSI as an ideal way for developing countries to
better control the importation of goods, compile statistical data,
facilitate cargo clearance, assure proper classification, reduce
smuggling and corruption, and enhance import duty and tax col-
lection.258 In addition, SGS believes PSI benefits exporters by
helping to maintain the solvency of U.S. trading partners, pro-
viding a fairer trading environment for U.S. exporters, which
are uniquely subject to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 25 9 and helping prevent importers from involving U.S. ex-
porters in illegal practices. 260 Furthermore, SGS believes PSI is
beneficial because it provides exporters with a free way to check
on their suppliers' practices while simultaneously facilitating
Letter of Credit issuance to pay for U.S. goods.261
One drawback of the PSI system may be competition among
several different PSI companies. Rather than being beneficial,
256. Letter from Jeremiah J. O'Neill, supra note 21; Memorandum from
SGS Government Programs, Inc., Preshipment Inspection of Imports: Guide-
lines for Exporters, Oct., 1996 (on file with Minnesota Journal of Global Trade).
257. According to its brochure, SGS is committed to carrying out inspection
in accordance with the Agreement on PSI. Memorandum from the SGS Govern-
ment Programs, Inc., supra note 256, at 3. In particular, SGS states its com-
mitment to: execution of inspections in a transparent and non-discriminatory
manner, protection of confidential business information, avoidance of conflicts
of interest, avoidance of delays, price verification procedures for establishing
the export market price and appeals procedures. Id. SGS also invites exporters
who feel SGS has not complied with the Agreement on PSI to complain or ap-
peal to the SGS office which carried out the inspection and after that to refer
the matter to an Independent Review. Id.
258. Id.
259. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1,
78dd-2, 78ff (1996) [hereinafter FCPAI. The FCPA was signed into law by Pres-
ident Carter on December 19, 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. I, § 101, 91 Stat.
1494 (1977).
260. Memorandum from SGS Government Programs, Inc., supra note 256.
261. Id.
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competition in the context of PSI market share may lead to at-
tempts by competing PSI entities to accommodate the exporter
or importer at the expense of accuracy and thoroughness. 262
B. AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF PSI
1. PSI Generally
Preshipment inspection is an invaluable "stepping stone"
for developing countries as they more fully participate in global
trade. On the other hand, nearly everyone, PSI entities ex-
cluded, agrees that though PSI can be an effective system, it is
not sufficient as a long term answer to a country's import inspec-
tion problems. 263 The PSI Agreement does not specify how long
countries using PSI can continue to use the system. So, in stat-
ing that PSI is only a temporary solution, the Agreement relies
on User Members working toward the eventual dismantling of
PSI systems used by their own countries. It is more prestigious
for a country to be able to maintain its own system for inspection
because it demonstrates a country's ability to support an exten-
sive infrastructure as well as to keep fraud and corruption at a
minimum. It also is probably more cost efficient. 264 Yet, PSI is
important and certainly should not be completely abolished from
the global trade scene in the near future.
PSI gives a country time to prepare itself for the more desir-
able port-of-unloading inspection systems. This time is neces-
sary to strengthen and expand a country's existing
infrastructure. Additionally, time is needed to train both cus-
toms officials and importers on the mechanics of the new system
and the skills they must possess in order to facilitate and par-
ticipate in the new system. Finally, time is required to ensure
262. Letter from Jeremiah J. O'Neill, supra note 21.
263. Because the PSI Agreement only provides for PSI to be used "for as
long and in so far as it is necessary to verify the quality, quantity or price of
imported goods," its signatories have implicitly accepted PSI's temporary na-
ture. PSI Agreement preamble.
264. For more information on the costs of PSI, see Low, supra note 5, at 52-
66. Direct assessment of the performance of PSI companies and the benefits of
their services is difficult for two reasons. Id. at 52. Governments often contract
for PSI services while simultaneously undertaking other reforms, thereby mak-
ing it almost impossible to determine the explanatory weight to be assigned to
the separate parts of the reform package. Id. In addition, quantified perform-
ance results cannot be taken at face value because many of the gains from PSI
intervention, especially on the revenue side, are realized only if the govern-
ments act on the PSI recommendations. Id. On the other hand, there is no real
basis from which to judge the possible deterrent effects of PSI. Id.
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that the country's economic infrastructure is technologically ad-
vanced enough to handle port-of-unloading inspection.
Indonesia's shift away from PSI illustrates this. Had Indo-
nesia used the twelve years when it relied on PSI to prepare it-
self for an eventual shift away from PSI, the switch would not
have been met with such fear and opposition. The primary com-
plaints of those opposed to the Indonesian shift away from PSI
focused on congestion and corruption. These two fears translate
into the problems of unchanged attitudes of customs officials 265
and the country's general lack of preparation to enter the new
system 266 due to lack of storage space, technology and computer
skills, and infrastructure. These are not problems that lack so-
lutions, or even problems with extremely difficult solutions;
however, these are problems that require time to solve.
Solutions to these problems also require money. In addition
to acting as an interim customs mechanism, PSI can serve to
strengthen the country's economy while the country prepares to
implement its own system.267 Employing PSI can facilitate
trade, increase national and international confidence in the
country's market, and increase import duties.
Without the necessary supplements of providing training
and bolstering infrastructure, a country runs the risk of becom-
ing "addicted" to PSI. Once again, Indonesia provides a helpful
example. Due to the lack of supplemental preparations, Indone-
sian and foreign business people became dependent on PSI and
viewed it as the only method of maintaining the levels of imports
and relative ease of trade that PSI had initially achieved. Addi-
tionally, confidence in the abilities of Indonesian customs offi-
cials to step in and take over was minimal, due to the lack of
265. See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text (discussing the corrup-
tion in the Indonesian Customs Department).
266. See supra notes 229-55 and accompanying text (discussing problems
caused by Indonesia's lack of preparation before switching from PSI to port-of-
unloading inspection).
267. If the process of readying the country takes place over ten to fifteen
years, the capital outlays can be spread out.
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extensive training268 that most believe is necessary for the facil-
itation of a customs inspection system.269
2. Effectiveness of PSI Agreement at Addressing
Exporters' Concerns
The PSI Agreement addresses all of the major concerns that
United States exporters had on the eve of the Uruguay Round.
Moreover, the PSI Agreement succeeded in addressing the two
underlying concerns of most exporters-PSI firms' unac-
countability and seeming omnipotence.
The PSI Agreement gained the trust of exporters through
the establishment of its appeals procedure, the Independent En-
tity, transparency, the price verification controls, and the protec-
tion of confidential business information. In particular, the
appeals procedure and the Independent Entity infuse the PSI
process with procedural predictability that was previously lack-
ing. Convinced that they will now have the opportunity to ex-
plain themselves, challenge the internal appeals procedure
determination if necessary, and be able to rely an independent
binding decision, exporters are more willing to subject them-
selves to PSI. In addition, the detailed Article on price verifica-
tion helps alleviate the exporters' fears that PSI firms could
make price verifications based on any factors they deem rele-
vant. Finally, the imposition on a named party, the User Mem-
bers, of the responsibility to ensure that the standards and rules
of the PSI Agreement are followed gives this Agreement the via-
bility it needs to be a success. However, even with these signifi-
cant strides, the PSI Agreement has not resolved all the
complaints about PSI. In December of 1997, upon the recom-
268. A country may contract with a PSI entity for more than PSI inspec-
tions-training or retraining of the country's own officials may also be part of
the contract package. Though the PSI entities either have or could easily ac-
quire the expertise needed to give this training, it probably is a better idea for
the training to come from some other source, because of the conflicts of interest
that arise when the PSI entity is required to train itself out of a contract. Low,
supra note 5, at 84-85.
269. In March of 1996, Nigeria announced its shift to the use of preshipment
inspection. 'M' is for Nigeria - Import and Export Regulations, AFRICAN ECON.
DIG., July 8, 1996, at 6, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File. The
change to preshipment inspection has allowed Nigeria to shift much of the cost
of inspection to exporters and importers, thus enabling it to cut up to 30% of its
Customs Staff. Id. This is an example of the kind of reorganization and weed-
ing out that PSI facilitates. With the implementation of PSI, Nigeria could con-
centrate on paring down its customs force to only those officials who were
honest and capable. Training of this smaller, more capable and efficient force
would be vastly more feasible.
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mendation of a WTO working party, the General Council agreed
to adopt a recommendation aimed at improving the implementa-
tion of the Agreement on PSI.270
V. CONCLUSION
In the 1980s, PSI attracted a number of developing coun-
tries because it allowed them, in spite of their customs corrup-
tion problems and deficient infrastructures, to participate in
global trade at increasingly higher levels. Though developing
countries were pleased with the use of PSI, large exporter coun-
tries perceived PSI firms as third parties intruding into in-
dependent, valid contracts. Most exporter complaints centered
on delays and increased costs caused by PSI, fears about the
confidentiality of business information required by PSI firms,
and problems with dispute resolution.
Due to these widely divergent views about PSI, the topic be-
came an issue for the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.
The result of the negotiations was the PSI Agreement. The PSI
Agreements' appeals procedure, Independent Entity, trans-
parency requirements, specific price verification rules, and pro-
tection of confidential business information helped alleviate
exporters' fears, allowing exporters and PSI-using importing
countries to put more faith in the process of PSI.
Though the PSI Agreement was a step in the right direction,
most still agree that PSI should not be the long term answer for
a country's importing needs. Instead, PSI should be used while
a country reformulates policy, retrains staff, bolsters infrastruc-
ture, and improves technology. This combination of PSI and si-
multaneous rebuilding allows a country to reap the benefits of
PSI, increased revenues and trade facilitation, but allows it to
attempt to avoid becoming dependent on PSI in the long term.
Yet, because the PSI Agreement does not specify guidelines or a
timeline from which to determine when a country no longer
needs PSI or should begin to move away from it, PSI is sure to
remain a contentious issue for years to come.
270. WTO Chief Says 1997 'Good Year for Trade,' But Warns Against Curbs
in Asia's Aftermath, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 2162 (Dec. 17, 1997).
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